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Foreword 
Signs that Scotlands economic tide is finally turning
Since 2015 Scotlands economic growth has 
failed to garner much in the way of significant 
momentum, a trend that has been compounded 
more recently by a decline in construction and 
sluggish growth in services. Yet there are now 
some signs that Scotlands economic performance 
is improving. Progress is slow and continues to 
lag behind the UK. However, there are grounds for 
cautious optimism with 2018 projected to be an 
improvement on the previous year.
The country saw considerable growth in exports 
in 2017.  It enjoys an excellent reputation in food 
and drink. Furthermore, sentiment in the North 
Sea is at its highest level for five years, in what 
is welcome news for an industry emerging from a 
downturn more lean and efficient, and now hinting 
at resurgence.
What is important now, is that businesses across 
the board, from food and drink to Fintech and 
everything in-between, are primed to embrace, 
swiftly, the opportunities that will arise, and 
tackle any challenges head-on. For some time, an 
inability to improve productivity has been a barrier 
to strengthening the prospects of our economic 
growth. While the core reasons for sluggish 
productivity growth are difficult to identify, there 
is little doubt that continuing investment in areas 
such as innovation, digital and technology are vital 
to enable continuing progress in how work is done.
Similarly, it is also important that our business 
leaders and workforce have the ability to adapt to a 
rapidly evolving economy which has an increasing 
emphasis on digital. As our Digital Disruption Index 
from May this year shows, there is consensus that 
greater investment is required to ensure employees 
have the digital skills required to implement an 
organisations digital strategy.  Such skills and 
strategies are much needed to truly maximise 
the benefits of technology, particularly emerging 
technologies such as artificial intelligence, 
virtual and augmented reality, and blockchain. A 
productive, highly trained workforce is pivotal to 
the strength of a relatively small and open economy 
such as Scotlands. 
Brexit remains the most immediate and complex 
of the challenges we face and the onus is on 
businesses to prepare as thoroughly as possible 
for a range of possible outcomes in the face of 
these circumstances.
Scotland has a resilient economy that has endured 
a tough few years. With improving confidence 
in business and a determination to capitalise on 
opportunities and prepare for challenges on the 
way, we should be confident the economy can 
improve on its growth rate in the next few years.
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
 June 2018
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institutes economic forecasts.
Deloittes Digital Disruption Index was published in May 2018. For further information please see  
www.deloitte.co.uk/digitaldisruption
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2017 was another year of weak growth in the 
Scottish economy. Output expanded by just 0.8% 
over the 12 month period, well below trend. 
The near future remains challenging, with Brexit 
continuing to cast a shadow of uncertainty over the 
outlook. 
That being said, we are cautiously optimistic about 
growth prospects for this year. Why? 
While the UK Government still lacks a credible and 
coherent vision for life outside the EU, the agreed 
2020 timetable for the UKs exit has helped shore 
up confidence amongst business in the short term. 
More generally, indicators of household / business 
sentiment have picked up in recent times. And 
whilst UK economic growth is slowing, global 
growth remains strong. 
Closer to home, the bad weather in March is likely 
to significantly dampen the Q1 Scottish growth 
figures, particularly for construction. 
This should be temporary. It will be important 
therefore not to read too much into next weeks 
GDP data but to wait until figures for Q2 are 
published. Only then will we have a full picture of 
the underlying health of the Scottish economy so 
far this year.
We forecast the Scottish economy will grow by 
around 1.2% in 2018 and by 1.3% in 2019  
still well below trend but  more positive than the 
forecasts of the Scottish Fiscal Commission.  
The Commissions recent revisions to their devolved 
tax forecasts, whilst small at the aggregate level, 
carry significant implications for the Scottish 
Budget. 
Summary
The combination of lower tax revenues and a higher 
block grant adjustment has opened up a £389m 
gap in the governments finances for 2018/19 
beyond its original plans. 
Under the Fiscal Framework for the Scottish Budget, 
the effect of this is not immediate as monies have 
already been allocated. But it will have to be 
addressed at some point with contingency plans 
no doubt now being made.  
This challenging outlook for the Scottish Budget 
will make the task of delivering on key policy 
priorities all that more challenging. 
The new Scottish Government 5-year financial 
strategy published last month sets out ambitious 
spending growth in key areas like the NHS, 
attainment, early years and social security. 
But with the Strategy envisaging a decline in the 
resource budget in real-terms, other areas will 
have to bear the brunt. Unprotected areas are on 
track to be cut by around 8% in real terms over the 
course of this parliament (16/17 to 21/22). This 
picture is unlikely to change significantly, despite 
the recent announcement of additional spending 
by the UK Government.
The greatest risk to the economic outlook remains 
Brexit. With just 9 months to go until the UK leaves 
the EU, the apparent lack of agreement within the 
UK Cabinet on basic issues like membership of the 
Customs Union is a major concern. 
But Brexit cannot be used as an excuse for all our 
economic challenges. Hopefully the recent debates 
on Scotlands economic future sparked by the 
Sustainable Growth Commission and others have 
illustrated the value of fresh thinking and new 
ideas irrespective of the constitutional settlement. 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
June 2018
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At a glance
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2% 1.3% 1.3%
Production 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Construction 0.8% 0.9% 0.9%
Services 1.2% 1.3% 1.2%
Table: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2018  2020
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Outlook and Appraisal
The Scottish economy continues to lag behind the UK and to grow much more slowly than in normal 
times. Whilst Brexit risks remain, and a combination of bad weather and poor construction sector figures 
may have a temporary impact on GDP during the first few months of the year, we believe that there are 
grounds to be cautiously optimistic for the rest of 2018.
Chart 1: Scottish and UK economic performance 
(GDP per head) since 2007
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Table 1: UK labour market, Feb-Apr 2018
Employment 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
(16+)
Inactivity 
(16-64)
Scotland 75.2 4.3 21.4
England 76.0 4.2 20.6
Wales 73.3 4.4 23.2
N. Ireland 69.7 3.3 27.9
Source: ONS
Chart 2: Scottish GDP growth and average annual oil 
price since 2013
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Introduction
The latest data shows the Scottish economy grew 
by just 0.8% during 2017  marking the 3rd year of 
weak growth. (Chart 1) 
The Scottish Fiscal Commission predicts growth of 
just 0.7% in 2018 and for it remain below 1% until 
at least 2024. 
Whilst we share the view that the outlook remains 
fragile and uncertain, we are slightly more optimistic 
about Scotlands near-term prospects. 
Our central view is that  on balance  the Scottish 
economy is showing signs that it will grow more 
quickly this year than last but is likely to still remain 
below trend. Why? 
First, whilst there are structural headwinds facing 
our economy we believe that the labour market will 
provide much needed resilience in the short-term 
with capacity still not fully utilised. (Table 1)
Second, the outlook for oil and gas in 2018  and its 
all-important supply chain  is more positive than it 
has been in almost three years. (Chart 2)
Third, there are signs that businesses and 
consumers are relatively more positive about the 
outlook. This should help boost demand. 
Growth is still likely to be modest by historical 
VWDQGDUGVDQGWKHUHUHPDLQVLJQLŏFDQWULVNV&KLHI
amongst them is Brexit. With 9 months until the UK 
leaves the EU, the lack of clarity over even the basic 
elements of our future relationship with the EU is a 
concern. 
Whilst the agreement for a transition period up to 
2020 has helped alleviate some immediate fears, 
the longer term damage to our economy from a Hard 
%UH[LWöZRXOGEHVLJQLŏFDQW7KHQHHGIRUHŎHFWLYH
economic leadership at the top of government has 
never been more urgent.
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Table 2: OECD forecasts for G7 Growth: 2017 
(outturn) to 2019
2017 2018 2019
UK 1.8 1.4 1.3
US 2.3 2.9 2.8
Japan 1.7 1.2 1.2
Canada 3.0 2.1 2.2
Euro Area 2.6 2.2 2.1
Germany 2.5 2.1 2.1
France 2.3 1.9 1.9
Italy 1.6 1.4 1.1
Source: OECD 
Chart 3: Global stock market resilience since 2007
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Chart 4: Global trade and industrial production, 
2013  2018
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The global economy
As we documented in Marchs Economic 
Commentary, the global economy has been 
performing strongly in recent times. 
At 3.8 percent, global growth in 2017 was ½ 
percentage point higher than in 2016 and the 
strongest since 2011. (Table 2)
Most projections are for world growth to continue at 
around 4% for the next few years  with the outlook 
positive for both advanced and emerging market 
economies. 
Europe is on course for its best performance in a 
decade. 
Unemployment is projected to continue to fall, with 
the OECD average on track to hit its lowest rate 
since 1980. Stock markets have returned to growth 
following their correction in February. (Chart 3) 
A feature of the recent pick-up in global activity has 
been the focus on investment and trade. 
Global exports, for example, have risen sharply 
over the past 12 months helping to boost industrial 
production. (Chart 4)  This should help ensure that 
the recent gains are sustained. 
These developments should prove positive for 
Scotlands economy. 
With Sterling trading around at 15% below its 
1RYHPEHUSHDNDQGZLWKLQŐDWLRQDU\
pressures easing, there is an important window for 
6FRWWLVKŏUPVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHEXR\DQF\LQ
global growth by exporting into new markets and 
expanding sales. (Chart 5)
Chart 5: Depreciation of Sterling, 2015  June 2018
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Chart 6: Growth in Scottish international exports and 
imports since 2010
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Chart 7: To what extent do you agree or disagree 
 Globalisation is an opportunity for economic 
growth, December 2017
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Chart 8: Percentage of EU GDP by country
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In contrast to recent years, Scottish exporters had a 
better year in 2017.
Imports from outside the UK had been growing 
faster than exports since 2011, eroding Scotlands 
international net trade balance. But last year marked 
a turnaround in fortunes, with Scottish international 
exports rising by 10%. (Chart 6)
This positive outlook for trade is, however, once 
again threatened by political uncertainty. 
7KH86GHFLVLRQWRLPSRVHWDULŎVRQVWHHODQG
aluminium might be politically appealing for some 
US voters, but it risks sparking a minor  or possibly 
major  trade war. 
Given our industrial structure, the Scottish economy 
should be relatively immune from any immediate 
impact. The potential, however, for the dispute 
to escalate is a more serious concern. The US is 
Scotlands largest single international destination 
for exports and a key market for major industries like 
whisky. 
It is not just international trade where there are 
risks, but also those from rising political uncertainty 
in Europe, e.g. Italy. Whilst the EU economy is now 
PRUHUHVLOLHQWWKDQLWZDVŏYH\HDUVDJRWKHUH
remains a hangover. 
In particular, the lack of meaningful progress 
in economic prospects for a large proportion of 
Europes population means that trust in the global 
economic system remains weak. (Chart 7)
Of course, we do not have far to look for our own 
uncertainty to act as a drag on growth in the UK. 
(Chart 9)
Chart 9: Surveys of the impact of Brexit on 
investment
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Chart 10: Weakest UK quarterly growth since 2015
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Chart 11: G7 GDP growth in 2016 and 2017  only 
UK slowing
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Chart 12: Decline in output driven by sharp decline 
in construction alongside weak growth in most other 
areas of economy
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The UK economy
UK economic growth was just 0.1% in Q1 2018  the 
weakest since the end of 2012. (Chart 10)
Annual growth has slipped to 1.2%. To put this in 
context, the UK economy grew by 3.1% in 2014 and 
had been one of the stand out performers in the G7 
as recently as 2016. (Chart 11)
The poor performance at the start of 2018 was 
driven by a sharp decline in construction (-2.7%) 
and sluggish growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Growth in services also slowed. (Chart 12)
Some of this can be attributed to the beast from 
the east shutting down the economy for a couple 
of days. But overall, ONS believe that wider factors 
also played a role. 
As we have argued before, reading too much into 
one data release should be avoided. However, these 
ODWHVWŏJXUHVDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDPRUHJHQHUDO
trend pointing toward a slowing UK economy. In 
April, manufacturing output fell by its fastest rate 
since 2012.  
Such a challenging trading environment will 
require businesses to be resilient and to focus 
upon the long-term drivers of productivity that 
they can control, such as investing in new plant 
DQGPDFKLQHU\HŎHFWLYHPDQDJHPHQWDQGVWDŎ
development. 
One positive has been rising real wages. For 
WKHŏUVWWLPHVLQFHWKHPL[RIJURZLQJ
QRPLQDOHDUQLQJVDQGIDOOLQJLQŐDWLRQKDVERRVWHG
household budgets. (Chart 13)
Chart 13: Annual wage growth and CPI, 2014  2018 
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Chart 14: Full-time and part-time self employment in 
the UK
Source: ONS
Chart 15: UK and G7 productivity since the financial 
crisis
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Chart 16: UK productivity quarterly growth, Q1 2016 
 Q1 2018
Source: ONS
This improvement in wages is one aspect of a UK 
labour market that continues to hold up remarkably 
well, with high rates of employment and low 
unemployment. 
However, as we have discussed before, underneath 
WKHVHKHDGOLQHŏJXUHVWKHUHDUHVLJQVRIIUDJLOLW\
For example, much of the recent growth in 
UK employment has been in the form of self-
employment. And as Chart 14 reveals, part-time self-
employment has been growing particularly quickly. 
As we discuss in detail later, productivity growth in 
the UK (and Scotland) has been a constant source of 
concern. 
Productivity continues to lag behind key 
competitors. (Chart 15)
There had been some optimism that UK productivity 
may have started to turnaround in 2017 with strong 
growth recorded in the 2nd half of the year. But 
output per hour fell once again at the start of 2018. 
(Chart 16)
This weakening in economic performance has 
spread through to the latest business surveys.  
For example, whilst all three UK PMI indicators  for 
services, manufacturing and construction  point 
to growth continuing, they are all lower than their 
historical averages. (Chart 17)
At the same time, the CBIs monthly tracker of 
industrial orders turned negative in May  and 
recorded its lowest value since 2016. The CBIs 
VPDOOEXVLQHVVDVVHVVPHQWRIFRQŏGHQFHZDVDOVR
negative.
Chart 17: UK Purchasing Managers Index (>50 
indicates expansion)
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Chart 18: Bank of England interest rate and market 
expectations
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Chart 19: Risk to business by factor, 100 = highest 
possible risk
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Chart 20: Evolution of independent UK forecasts for 
2018
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The speed of the deterioration in performance 
caught many economists by surprise. It was 
undoubtedly a key reason why the Bank of England 
chose to delay the widely trailed rise in interest rates 
which many had pencilled in for May. 
Expectations are still for interest rates to rise in the 
near future but there is uncertainty over when this 
will occur. (Chart 18) In a speech at the Fraser of 
Allander Institute in April, Michael Saunders of the 
Monetary Policy Committee outlined his view that 
interest rates should rise gradually and at a pace 
that need not be glacial. 
The prospect of weak demand in the domestic 
economy now dominates the risk register of many UK 
ŏUPV&KDUW
Most forecasters predict that the UK economy will 
grow by around 1.4% in 2018 and by 1.5% in 2019. 
Long-term growth in the UK is typically between 2 to 
2.5%. (Chart 20)
Of course, Brexit looms on the horizon. To an extent, 
the planned transition period now agreed between 
the UK and the EU has improved optimism amongst 
EXVLQHVVHVDQGKDVDFWHGWRKHOSZDUGRŎDQ\
immediate uncertainties. (Chart 21) 
But the lack of clarity about the UKs future 
relationship with the EU remains a major concern for 
many businesses.  
Chart 21: Impact of the Brexit transition 
announcement, net % of respondents
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Chart 22: Economic growth in Scotland since 2013
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Chart 23: Drivers of growth in Scotland by sector, 
2014 - 2017
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Chart 24: Performance of manufacturing sectors tied 
to North Sea Supply Chain since fall in oil price
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The Scottish economy
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three months of 2017  marking another quarter of 
below trend growth. (Chart 22)
Annual growth was just 1.1% (or 0.8% on a 4Q-on-
4Q basis). This was slightly weaker than our forecast 
of around 1.2%. 
The downturn in oil and gas has clearly been a driver 
of Scotlands recent weak economic performance  
with many of the manufacturing sectors tied to the 
North Sea experiencing a sharp recession. 
As Chart 23 highlights, the decline in these 
production industries had a material impact on 
headline Scottish growth in both 2015 and 2016. 
But in recent times, these sectors have stabilised. 
Instead, it has been a sharp fall in construction 
activity that has held back growth  see below for a 
further discussion.
At the same time, activity in services have been 
muted. In a number of industries  including 
SURIHVVLRQDOŏQDQFHUHWDLODQGZKROHVDOHVHUYLFHV
 activity during 2017 was weaker than in 2016. 
(Chart 25)
One exception was health and social work. This 
is a peculiar sector from an economic statistics 
perspective and is largely made up of the NHS and 
UHODWHGDFWLYLWLHV,WLVDOVRGLőFXOWWRPHDVXUH
For a sector that makes up around 9% of the 
economy, it has apparently seen remarkable growth 
in recent times  not just on its own but relative to 
sectors like education and public admin. (Chart 26)
Chart 25: Services in Scotland: 2016 vs. 2017
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Chart 26: Growth in public services GDP in 
Scotland since 1998
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Chart 27: Domestic vs. external demand in Scotland 
for 2017 (nominal terms)
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Chart 28: International manufactured exports since 
2010
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As highlighted above, international trading 
conditions have been positive in recent times and 
this has helped to boost Scottish exports. 
As a result, with rest of world (ROW) exports growing 
faster than imports, Scotlands economy has been 
supported by growing external demand  although 
net trade with the rest of the UK (RUK) has weakened 
further. (Chart 27) 
The source of Scotlands strong export performance 
has been from traditional sectors.  
International manufactured exports are up 30% on 
2010 levels (in real terms). Key to this success has 
been strong growth in food & drink, petrochemicals 
and engineering. (Chart 28) These three sectors 
account for over 80% of Scottish manufactured 
exports. 
In sharp contrast, one area of ongoing concern is 
the continued decline in business investment which 
fell by a further 10% in 2017. In real terms, annual 
business investment in Scotland is some 25% below 
1998 levels. (Chart 29)
It is hard to argue that this is linked to Brexit and 
not instead a more structural problem within the 
Scottish economy. The new Scottish National 
Investment Bank may help at the margins, but its 
funds are small and it seems it is a lack of demand 
IRUŏQDQFHóUDWKHUWKDQVXSSO\óWKDWLVWKHJUHDWHVW
barrier to investment.
Chart 29: Business investment in Scotland as a 
share of GDP
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Chart 30: Growth in Scottish GDP and construction 
sector GDP since 2010
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Chart 31: Scottish GDP performance since 2013, 
with and without construction 
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Chart 32: Revisions to Scottish construction series
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Construction
As highlighted above  and raised in our previous 
Economic Commentary  one of the key drivers of 
the weak performance of the Scottish economy in 
2017 has been the sharp fall in construction activity. 
(Chart 30)
According to the most recent data, over the past 12 
months construction output fell by 6.5%  and is 
nearly 10% below its 2015 peak.  
As the chart highlights however, all of this is on the 
back of a sharp spike in activity during 2014 and 
2015 (where output rose 27%). 
The scale of these changes have had a material 
impact on Scottish growth rates. 
Indeed, if we remove construction then overall 
growth would have been 1.7% for 2017 as opposed 
to the 1.1% reported. To put this in context, UK 
growth in 2017 was 1.4%. (Chart 31)
New data published in early June from the ONS 
suggests that such trends are likely to continue in 
the new data to be released next week.  
As Chart 32 highlights, even with a revised 
methodology to track construction activity across 
the UK, the sharp rise and subsequent fall in 
Scottish construction remains. 
7KHNH\GULYHURIWKLVYRODWLOLW\KDVEHHQWKHSURŏOH
of infrastructure spending. Chart 33 shows the 
ONS series for infrastructure in Scotland vis-à-vis 
(QJODQG7KHGLŎHUHQFHLVVWULNLQJ
Chart 33: Infrastructure new work in Scotland and 
England, Q1 2010 = 100
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Chart 34: Output growth in the construction sector 
vs. job growth in the construction sector since 2010
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Chart 35: Outlook for Scottish Government capital 
budget
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
£
 m
ill
io
n
, 
2
0
1
7
/1
8
 p
ri
c
e
s
March Budget 2016 Autumn Statement Nov 2016
March Budget 2017 November Budget 2017
With max annual borrowing
Source: FAI
Chart 36: Construction activity during bad weather 
(Q4 2010)
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At the same time, we see nothing like this pattern 
IRU6FRWODQGLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQHPSOR\PHQWŏJXUHV
(Chart 34)
So what explains this? 
We know of a small number of private infrastructure 
projects which will have boosted activity  e.g. 
£800m gas plant in Shetland (2016) and £300 
million Beauly-Denny grid upgrade (a couple of 
years earlier). But these cannot explain the scale of 
PRYHPHQWLQWKHRőFLDOVWDWLVWLFV
The government has suggested that the completion 
of large and iconic public projects  e.g. the 
Queensferry Crossing and M8 corridor  could also 
be a factor.
Whilst a possibility, it can only tell part of the 
story. Whilst these projects have been delivered, 
the amount of money the government is actually 
spending on public infrastructure is rising. (Chart 
35)
One more plausible explanation might be the impact 
RIWKHUHFODVVLŏFDWLRQRI13'SURMHFWVE\WKH216
7KHVXEVHTXHQWUHSURŏOLQJRIVSHQGDQGORVVRI
additionality in public investment may be behind 
part of the slowdown. 
%XWDOOWKLQJVFRQVLGHUHGZHVWLOOŏQGWKHUHFHQW
statistics on construction very puzzling. We have yet 
to see a convincing explanation from either the ONS 
or the Scottish Government. We cannot help but 
think that there is something with the methodology 
being used to measure activity in Scotland that is 
VNHZLQJWKHŏJXUHV
Irrespective of this, one thing that we can conclude 
with certainty is that based upon past methodology, 
QH[WZHHNöVFRQVWUXFWLRQ*'3ŏJXUHVZLOOVKRZD
further sharp fall. 
According to the ONS, the value of construction 
sector output in Q1 for Scotland is down 15% in a 
year.  
The collapse of Carillion in January may be a factor. 
But like the bad weather in March, any impact is 
likely to be temporary  as was the case back in 
2010. (Chart 36) 
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Table 3: Scotland and UK labour market, Feb-Apr 
2018
Employment 
rate 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
rate 
(16+)
Inactivity 
rate 
(16-64)
Scotland 75.2% 4.3% 21.4%
Quarterly change (pp) 0.4 0.0 -0.5
Annual change (pp) 1.1 0.3 -1.3
UK 75.6% 4.2% 21.0%
Quarterly change (pp) 0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Annual change (pp) 0.8 -0.4 -0.5
Source: ONS
Chart 37: Scottish employment & unemployment 
rate since 2008
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
 (
1
6
-6
4
)
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
ra
te
 (
1
6
+
)
Unemployment rate (16+) (LHS)
Employment rate (16-64) (RHS)
Source: ONS
Chart 38: Growth in average weekly hours worked by 
employment status since 2008
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Labour market
The latest data illustrate that the Scottish labour 
market continues to remain relatively robust with 
high employment and low unemployment. (Table 3)
There are 18,000 more people in work than a year 
ago but 9,000 more people in unemployment than a 
year ago. (Chart 37)
The quarterly unemployment rate was maintained at 
4.3% over the period Feb-Apr, with the employment 
rate rising by 0.4% points over the same 3 months.
Scotland now has an unemployment rate slightly 
above that of the UK and an employment rate nearly 
half a percentage point lower. Although as we have 
discussed before, such small variations are not 
VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLŏFDQW
:LWKLQFUHDVHGŐH[LELOLW\LQWKHODERXUPDUNHWZH
continue to see changes in working hours and the 
type of employment being undertaken.
Chart 38 shows that part-time workers have seen 
their hours grow, on average, by around 3% over 
the past decade. In contrast, the hours worked by 
full time workers are now back to 2008 levels. So 
the rise in hours worked in the Scottish economy is 
coming from increases via part-time rather than full-
time workers.
While self-employment remains a relatively small 
proportion of those in employment in the Scottish 
labour market, it is growing. 
Indeed, 70% of the growth in employment over the 
past two years has stemmed from self-employment. 
(Chart 39) 
Chart 39: Number of self-employed in Scotland, 
2012  2017
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Chart 40: Underemployment (in terms of hours 
worked) in Scotland and the UK since 2008
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Chart 41: Demand and availability index for Scotland 
since 2003
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Chart 42: Youth (16-24) employment and 
unemployment since 2008
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This changing pattern of labour market activity is 
one reason why we believe that there is perhaps 
more capacity to be utilised than others. 
Underemployment continues to fall, but remains 
DERYHSUHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVOHYHOV&KDUW
Similarly, despite an apparently tight labour market 
we continue to see little in the way of substantial 
wage pressure building up in the Scottish economy. 
(Chart 41)
Taken together  and even though data such as 
Chart 41 appear to show high demand and low 
availability of workers  we still believe that there is 
scope to achieve better outcomes (particularly for 
those in work). 
One of the most notable trends over the past two 
years has been the substantial falls in youth (16-24 
year old) unemployment. 
Over 2017, youth unemployment hit a record low 
RI7KLVLVOHVVWKDQKDOIZKDWLWZDVŏYH\HDUV
ago. In 2012, youth unemployment was 20.5%. 
(Chart 42)
Scotlands record low rate of youth unemployment is 
impressive in its own right, but particularly so when 
compared to other parts of Europe and beyond, only 
a handful of which have youth unemployment rates 
lower than Scotlands. (Chart 43)
Chart 43: 16-24 year old unemployment rate by 
country, 2017
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Chart 44: Scottish productivity performance since 
2015
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Chart 45: Sources of change in productivity in 
Scotland since 2016
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Chart 46: Scotland and UK % / pp difference in 
employment rate and productivity since 199
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Productivity
The latest data shows that productivity in Scotland 
fell again in 2017  and is now over 3% lower than 
in 2015. (Chart 44)
7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVóZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIWKHŏQDO
quarter of 2018  has been that the number of hours 
worked in the economy has been increasing at a 
faster rate than overall economic growth. (Chart 45). 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVUHTXLULQJHYHUPRUHHŎRUWVLPSO\
to keep production at the same level. 
Much has been made of the fact that Scotlands 
productivity has caught-up with the UK  and this is 
indeed the case.  
But as Chart 46 highlights, the reason for this can 
EHHŎHFWLYHO\WUDFHGEDFNWRWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH
6FRWWLVKODERXUPDUNHWGXULQJWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
when Scotland lost more jobs than the UK as a 
whole. As a result, our productivity improved. 
Whether or not this can be viewed as catching-up 
with the UK is open to question. 
Even then, catching up with the UK is not something 
to write home about. The UK  and its constituent 
parts outside of London  lags behind many of our 
key competitors in Europe. (Chart 47)
Boosting productivity is a key goal of policymakers. 
Much of the policy focus tends to be on high-end 
productivity improvements  e.g. so-called frontier 
ŏUPVRULQLWLDWLYHVWRERRVWLQQRYDWLRQ5	'DQG
university activities.  
Chart 47: Labour productivity in 2014 by region, UK 
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Chart 48: Distribution of labour productivity by firm, 
Scotland 2015
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Chart 49: Relative productivity and size of sector in 
Scotland
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Chart 50: Firm productivity and industry-mix effects 
on average productivity, 2015
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Whilst valuable, it is important to remember that the 
YDVWPDMRULW\RIŏUPVLQ6FRWODQGVKDUHEURDGO\WKH
same level of (low) productivity. 
Modest improvements amongst this group, e.g. 
through better connectivity, improved skills, process 
innovation and better management arguably have 
greater potential to boost overall productivity in 
Scotland. (Chart 48)
Similarly, the make-up of the Scottish economy itself 
drives productivity. 
As Chart 49 highlights, manufacturers tend to 
have amongst the highest levels of productivity in 
Scotland. 
But services make up a much greater share of 
our economy. So alongside boosting levels of 
manufacturing, improving productivity in labour 
intensive service sectors is just as crucial.
The scope for many of these local services 
productivity improvements will be limited, but that 
is not to say that more cannot be done.
New data from the ONS aims to split up UK 
SURGXFWLYLW\GDWDDFFRUGLQJWRGLŎHUHQFHVE\ó
 Ł GLŎHUHQFHVLQWKHSURGXFWLYLW\RIŏUPVLQ
each industry and, 
 Ł WKHPL[RIGLŎHUHQWLQGXVWULHVLQWKH
economy.
A higher value of Firm Productivity than the UK 
DYHUDJHVXJJHVWVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOŏUPVLQDJLYHQ
industry tend to be more productive than elsewhere. 
A higher value of the Industry Mix implies that the 
UKs more productive industries tend to be located 
in a given locality. 
For Scotland we see that compared to the UK 
DYHUDJHOLNHPRVWSDUWVRIWKH8.DWDŏUPOHYHORXU
businesses tend to be slightly less productive than 
average, but we do tend to have a disproportionate 
number of highly productive sectors in Scotland. 
(Chart 50)
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Chart 51: Retail sales in Scotland and UK, quarterly 
real terms change since 2016
-2%
-1%
-1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2016 2017 2018
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
%
)
Scotland GB
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 52: Consumer confidence, Scotland and UK
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Chart 53: Scottish Consumer Sentiment Indicator: 
expectations for economy and household finances
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Latest economic data for Scotland
5HFHQWGDWDRQ6FRWODQGöVHFRQRP\RŎHUVVRPH
signs for cautious optimism. 
:KLOVWVLJQLŏFDQWULVNVUHPDLQPRVWLQGLFDWRUVDUH
pointing to a better outlook for 2018 compared to 
2017. 
The agreement for a transition period to 2020 for 
the UKs exit from the EU has helped provide some, 
albeit short-term, clarity for businesses. 
Retail sales for Q1 2018 were positive in Scotland, 
with growth of 0.5% over the quarter. This was 
despite the beast from the east, with growth 
outperforming Great Britain for only the third time in 
two years. (Chart 51)
&RQVXPHUFRQŏGHQFHOHYHOVZKLOVWUHPDLQLQJZHDN
by historical standards, have also picked up in 
UHFHQWWLPHV7KH*I.LQGH[RIFRQVXPHUFRQŏGHQFH
recorded its best performance in April since the end 
of 2016 (although it slipped back a little in May). 
(Chart 52)
The Scottish Governments own indicator of 
consumer sentiment has also improved slightly. 
(Chart 53)
Indicators of labour market demand continue to 
post relatively healthy returns. The Bank of Scotland 
Jobs Barometer was 63 in May, and continues to be 
above its long-term moving average. (Chart 54)
Chart 54: Scottish Jobs market survey showing 
ongoing resilience
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Chart 55: Royal Bank of Scotland PMI for Scotland  
up-tick in activity
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Chart 56: FAI/RBS Scottish Business Monitor shows 
optimism improving
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Chart 57: Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly 
Index for early 2018 suggests a rise in confidence
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Indicators of business sentiment  again, whilst not 
showing strong growth  have also been slightly 
more positive in recent times. 
For example, after a lull at the start of the year, the 
PMI for Scotland hit a ten month high in May. (Chart 
55). 
The latest FAI-RBS Scottish Business Monitor did dip 
GXULQJWKHŏUVWTXDUWHURIEXWH[SHFWDWLRQVIRU
the next 3 to 6 months are more positive. (Chart 56)
Within sectors, our latest survey with the Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce suggests positive sentiment 
across the board, with the exception of tourism 
ZKLFKDGPLWWHGO\LVFRPLQJRŎWKHEDFNRIDYHU\
strong 2017). (Chart 57)
The same survey reports a pick-up in investment 
levels across most sectors. 
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWVLJQLŏFDQWWXUQDURXQGLQ
sentiment has been in oil and gas. (Chart 58)
Boosted by oil prices returning to between $75 and 
DQGVLJQLŏFDQWFRVWFXWWLQJLQWKHVHFWRUDQG
DVVRFLDWHGVXSSO\FKDLQFRQŏGHQFHKDVUHWXUQHGWR
its highest level since spring 2013. 
Our latest survey found that 41% of businesses 
are working at or above optimum levels, 75% are 
IRUHFDVWLQJDULVHLQSURŏWVWKLV\HDUDQGDURXQG
70% see a further rise in business optimism this 
coming year.
Chart 58: FAI/AGCC optimism in oil and gas on the 
rise
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Table 4: Nowcasts for Q1 2018 and Q2 2018 for 
Scotlands GDP
Q1 Q2
Quarterly Growth 0.29% 0.29%
Annualised Growth 1.18% 1.16%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 59: Impact of bad weather on Q4 2010 
Scottish GDP statistics
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Table 5: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2018 2019 2020
Bank of England 1.4 1.7 1.7
OBR 1.5 1.3 1.3
NIESR 1.4 1.7 1.8
European Commission 1.5 1.2 n/a
IMF 1.6 1.5 1.5
Oxford Economics 1.5 1.7 1.9
ITEM Club 1.4 1.7 n/a
CBI 1.5 1.3 n/a
Source: HM Treasury
Our forecasts
Before turning to our forecasts, it is helpful to review 
what our latest nowcasts are saying about the 
outlook for the Scottish economy.
7KHVHXVHWKHODWHVWRőFLDODQGXQRőFLDOGDWDHJ
business and employment surveys) to provide a 
statistical prediction of current growth. 
2XUODWHVWŏJXUHVLQFOXGLQJGDWDXSWRHDUO\-XQH
2018, predict growth of around 0.3% in Q1 and Q2 
2018 and 1.2% for the year. This points to growth 
below trend, but ahead of 2017. (Table 4)
One word of caution. Our nowcasts are based upon 
trends from a variety of data points at an economy 
wide and/or sectoral level. Individual factors  
e.g. the impact of bad weather on a retailer or 
WKHFROODSVHRIDFRQVWUXFWLRQŏUPóZLOOQRWEH
immediately picked up. 
In each individual quarter, the actual GDP series will 
WKHUHIRUHGLŎHUIRUDYDULHW\RIUHDVRQV
It is highly likely that the GDP data for Q1 will be 
below expectations  or close to zero  because of 
the bad weather in March (the so-called beast from 
the east). 
However, we expect such disruption to be 
temporary. It therefore has not had a material impact 
on our forecasts for the year as a whole. 
The last time we had such poor weather was back in 
winter 2010. As Chart 59 highlights, the weather did 
have an impact on Scottish GDP in Q4 2010, but the 
blip was temporary. 
It will be important therefore, not to read too much 
LQWRDQ\ZHDN*'3ŏJXUHQH[WZHHN$FRPSOHWH
SLFWXUHZLOOEHSRVVLEOHRQO\RQFHWKHŏUVWPRQWKV
of data are available this autumn.  
For comparison, the latest forecasts for the UK as a 
whole are highlighted in Table 5. 
Overall, most organisations are predicting that 
growth will remain below trend for the foreseeable 
future. The OBR are amongst the most pessimistic, 
forecasting growth of just 1.3% in 2019 and 2020. 
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Table 6: FAI forecast Scottish GDP growth (%) 2018 
to 2020
2018 2019 2020
GDP 1.2% 1.3% 1.3%
Production 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Construction 0.8% 0.9% 0.9%
Services 1.2% 1.3% 1.2%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 60: Growth to remain below trend through 
forecast
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GLŎHUHQWIRUHFDVWKRUL]RQV
Chart 61: Contribution to FAI forecast 2018 to 2020
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Turning to our forecasts, as in the past we report 
a central forecast but calculate uncertainty bands 
to set out a likely range within which we predict 
Scottish growth will lie.
Our forecasts are little changed on March.
The assessment is still the same  we believe that 
the economy will remain below trend, but that 
growth will pick-up this year. (Table 6)
Our forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2018.  
We share the SFCs view that the Scottish economy 
faces long-term challenges  e.g. an ageing 
population and weak productivity. But in the short-
term, we think that there is the potential for demand 
to pick-up as the economy makes up recent lost 
ground. 
At a sectoral level, services should continue to make 
the greatest overall contribution to growth. Tourist 
IDFLQJEXVLQHVVHVóVXFKDVKRWHOVóZKLOVWRŎWR
a slower start in 2018 should continue to do well. 
(Chart 60)
Weak earnings growth will mean that household 
spending  and the industries that they support 
(e.g. in retail)  will remain fragile. 
Production sectors  particularly manufacturing  
VKRXOGFRQWLQXHWREHQHŏWIURPWKHZHDNSRXQGDQG
the pick-up in activity in the North Sea. Scotlands 
food & drink industry continues to perform strongly 
DQGVKRZVQRVLJQRIHDVLQJRŎ
In looking forward, we have lowered our central 
forecast for growth in 2019 and 2020 to 1.3% in 
both years. (Chart 61)
7KLVUHŐHFWVDVOLJKWO\ZHDNHURXWORRNIRUWKH8.DVD
whole. We expect the growth gap between Scotland 
and the UK to remain over the next couple of years, 
but to continue to narrow. 
7KHUHDUHVLJQLŏFDQWULVNVWRVXFKIRUHFDVWVKRZHYHU
We clearly do not live in normal times, with Brexit 
uncertainty having a cooling impact on investor 
VHQWLPHQW7KHSRVVLELOLW\RIWLWIRUWDWWDULŎVZLWK
WKH86LVDOVRDQRWKHUVLJQLŏFDQWULVN$VDUHVXOW
WKHSRWHQWLDOIRUDPDMRUFKDQJHLQFRQŏGHQFH
impacting on the outlook cannot be ruled out. 
However, should greater clarity be provided over the 
UKs future relationship with the EU post-Brexit, we 
should see some pick-up in activity. 
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Table 7: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2020
2018 2019 2020
Employee jobs 2,493,150 2,516,750 2,540,350
% employee job 
growth over year
+0.9% +0.9% +0.9%
ILO unemployment 115,150 118,000 124,800
Rate (%)1 4.3 4.4 4.5
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
Chart 62: Scotland and UK GDP growth forecasts, 
2018  2022
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Policy context
We expect unemployment to rise slightly toward a 
level consistent with more medium-term trends of 
around 5%. So any reported rise in unemployment 
in the coming months should pose little concern. 
(Table 7)
On balance, our forecasts put us slightly behind 
those made by the Bank of England for the UK as a 
whole, but broadly in line with the OBR. 
We remain more positive than the Scottish Fiscal 
Commission. (Chart 62)
The medium-term fiscal outlook for the Scottish Government
The Scottish Governments 2018/19 Budget  is the 
2nd of 5 budgets to be set this parliamentary term. 
It contained allocations for 2018/19 only (the last 
time a Scottish Budget provided anything beyond 
single year allocations was 2014/15). 
However, the governments new Five Year Financial 
Strategy, published last month, provides a steer 
on how the pattern and distribution of Scottish 
resource spending (day-to-day public services) is 
likely to evolve over the next few years.  
The Strategy contains forecasts of the Scottish 
EXGJHWIRUŏYH\HDUVEDVHGRQIRUHFDVWVIRU
devolved tax revenues and the outlook for the block 
grant. It also sets out broad spending commitments.
Government spending priorities
The most obvious spending change during this 
parliament results from the devolution of ten social 
VHFXULW\EHQHŏWV7KHŏUVWRIWKHVHDQHQKDQFHG
Carers Allowance, will come on stream in summer 
2018.
At face value the resource budget will be over 
£3bn higher, at £30.5bn, than it was in 2016/17. 
However, if we strip out the resources being 
WUDQVIHUUHGWRSD\IRUWKHVHQHZEHQHŏWVDQG
consider the Scottish budget on a like-for-like 
basis, the resource budget  based on the Scottish 
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Governments latest scenarios  is expected to be 
around half a percent lower in real terms by the 
end of this parliament compared to the end of the 
preceding parliament.
How will the government prioritise its declining 
UHVRXUFHEXGJHW"7KH)LYH<HDU6WUDWHJ\LGHQWLŏHVVL[
key commitments that support the Governments 
VRFLDOFRQWUDFWDQGUHTXLUHVLJQLŏFDQWLQYHVWPHQWö
These are:
 Ł Health: to increase NHS resource spending by 
£2bn over the parliament. 
 Ł Police: to protect the resource budget of the 
Scottish Police Authority in real terms over the 
parliament.
 Ł Early learning and childcare: to increase 
resource funding to local authorities to £567m 
annually by the end of the parliament to 
support 1,140 hours per year of childcare.
 Ł Attainment: to allocate £750m to the 
Attainment Scotland Fund over the 
parliamentary term.
 Ł Higher Education: to continue to allocate £1bn 
each year to the sector.
 Ł Social Security: to deliver a more generous 
Carers Allowance Supplement from 2018 and 
a new Best Start Grant (replacing Sure Start 
Maternity Grant) from 2019. These policies 
imply costs of £35m in 2018/19, rising to 
£56m in 2019/20 and more thereafter.
Chart 63: Resource spending on health as a share of  
departmental resource budget, 2016/17 to 2021/22
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Implications for non-priority spending
But if the governments overall resource budget 
is falling in real terms, what is the impact on the 
governments other areas of spend (those that are 
QRWPHQWLRQHGDVDVSHFLŏFSULRULW\"
7KH)LYH<HDU6WUDWHJ\LGHQWLŏHVDõFHQWUDOVFHQDULRö
 based on the latest forecasts for the block grant 
and Scottish tax revenues  as well as an upper 
range and a lower range scenario around that. The 
upper and lower range scenarios are developed by 
considering historic variation in tax revenues that 
have been transferred to Scotland.
Under the governments central scenario, the 
resource budget available for these other areas will 
fall by around 10% in real terms between 2016/17 
and 2021/22.
The areas included in this catch-all other category 
include local government (including schools outwith 
the ring-fenced Attainment Fund), enterprise, the 
environment, tourism and culture.
However, the outlook for local government is 
unlikely to be as bleak as this. The analysis up until 
this point does not include Non-Domestic Rate 
Income (NDRI). Including forecasts for NDRI, the 
resources available for other spending areas will 
fall by around 8% over the course of the parliament 
in real terms, under the central scenario. (Chart 64)
Chart 64: Cumulative real terms change in spend on 
other policy areas
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Of course, within these aggregates lie other 
commitments. Some of these are legally binding  
for example £1bn of repayments per year to fund 
historical PFI and NPD capital programmes. Others 
are policy related  for example, the government 
has pledged to introduce some form of Income 
Supplement for low income families. And there will 
be ongoing costs from the implementation of the 
QHZŏVFDOSRZHUVSDUWLFXODUO\LQHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH
Social Security Agency.
Uncertainty and alternative scenarios
$VQRWHGLQWKH)LYH<HDU6WUDWHJ\WKHUHLVVLJQLŏFDQW
uncertainty around the Scottish budget outlook. 
The Five Year Strategy considers upside and 
downside risks around the central scenario, and the 
implications for spending on other areas if these 
upside or downside risks materialise. 
If there was additional departmental spending for 
Whitehall, and if devolved revenues perform better 
than forecast, then the Scottish Governments more 
positive budget outlook could be realised. Under 
this scenario, spending on other areas would fall 
by slightly less than 3% over the period 2016/17  
2021/22.
On the other hand, there are also downside risks. 
Under the governments lower scenario, spending 
on other areas of the budget will fall by 17%, even 
if buoyant NDR income is taken into account. 
Arguably, the downside risks in the Strategy are less 
likely to be realised than the upside risks. This is 
partly because it has been clear for some time that 
the UK Government likely to announce additional 
NHS spending at the UK level, which will generate 
consequentials for Scotland. But it is also partly 
because the central scenario is based on the latest 
forecasts for tax revenues and the block grant 
adjustment, which envisage an unprecedented 
divergence in relative wage growth (and hence tax 
revenue performance) between Scotland and rUK 
over the next two years.
Indeed, in the end the UK Government announce 
substantial additional funding for the NHS in 
England on 18 June. It will be up to the Scottish 
Government to determine how it might distribute any 
consequentials across its portfolio responsibilities. 
In its Five Year Strategy however, it indicates that it 
ZLOOSDVVRQDQ\FRQVHTXHQWLDOVDULVLQJVSHFLŏFDOO\
from health spending in England to the Scottish 
health budget. This would suggest that other areas 
of the Scottish budget will face no less of a squeeze 
as a result of the consequentials arising from the 
increase in UK Government health spending.
Another question is whether or not the government 
is or might consider making further changes to 
tax policy over the remainder of the parliament  
something that Cabinet Secretary for Finance Derek 
MacKay refused to rule out when giving evidence 
to the parliaments Finance and Constitution 
Committee.
Of course, if the expected increase in health 
spending by the UK Government is funded at least 
in part by an increase in rUK income tax  which 
would not apply in Scotland  this would pose some 
interesting tax setting dilemmas for the Scottish 
Government in its December budget.
&RQFOXVLRQV6FRWODQGöVŏVFDORXWORRN
The publication of Scotlands Fiscal Outlook: the 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWöVŏYH\HDUŏQDQFLDOVWUDWHJ\ö
establishes the governments policy priorities over 
the remainder of this parliament (and beyond), and 
WKHŏQDQFLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKRVHFRPPLWPHQWV
The Five Year Strategy is not a budget document 
however, and it says little about the plans for 
portfolios or policies that are not explicitly 
mentioned in the strategy itself. 
Over the course of this parliament, spending 
on other areas could fall slightly or much more 
substantially, depending on how the governments 
budget evolves. Either way, the clear conclusion is 
that the funding settlement is likely to be tight. 
The Five Year Strategy says little about how the 
governments plans might change if (and when) 
WKHŏQDQFLDORXWORRNHYROYHV,IWKHEXGJHWRXWORRN
improves will other policy priorities be allocated 
additional resources, or might existing priorities be 
allocated more? 
The publication of the Governments Five Year 
Strategy means we are a little clearer about the 
ŏVFDOSULRULWLHVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWEXWWKHUHUHPDLQV
VLJQLŏFDQWXQFHUWDLQW\DURXQGWKHEXGJHWRXWORRN
The three remaining Scottish budgets of this 
parliament will be keenly watched.
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